Japan-US Negotiations - Nichibei Kosho

Informal diplomatic maneuvers and diplomatic negotiations on the outbreak of war were conducted by both Japan and the United States for about a year before the attack on Pearl Harbor, with the aim of avoiding or delaying war against the United States and Britain. As the Second Sino-Japanese War expanded, relations between Japan and the United States worsened, and the United States notified the US of its intention to abolish the Treaty of Amity and Navigation in 1939 (Showa 14), imposed economic sanctions against Japan's occupation of northern French Indochina and the signing of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy in 1940, froze assets in Japan, and completely banned the export of oil to Japan (the Japan embargo issue) in 1941. In this context, the second Konoe Fumimaro cabinet began Japan-US negotiations in 1941, but the history of the negotiations began in the summer of 1940 with peace maneuvers for Japan by Drout and others from the Catholic Foreign Missions of the United States. Draught arrived in Japan in November of that year and attempted to establish an informal diplomatic channel to the Japanese government and military through Ikawa Tadao (director of the Central Bank of Japan), and to the White House through Postmaster General Walker after his return to the United States in January 1941. In April of that year, Draught, Ikawa and others prepared a Japan-US Draft of Understanding that toned down the anti-American nature of the Tripartite Pact, and thereafter diplomatic negotiations at the intergovernmental level were conducted based on this draft, with Ambassador to the United States Nomura Kichisaburo and Secretary of State Hull at the core. However, on the Japanese side, Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke opposed the Draft of Understanding, and the United States also hardened its stance in response to the changing situation in Europe after the outbreak of the German-Soviet War and Japan's occupation of southern French Indochina, and the negotiations stalled. Later, in an attempt to break the deadlock, Konoe proposed a meeting between the leaders of Japan and the United States with Roosevelt, but it did not come to fruition, and Japan decided on the outline of its imperial national policy with a stance toward both peace and war, deciding on the final negotiation plans, "Plans A and B," on November 6th. This proposal was rejected by the Hull Note, dated the 26th, presented by US Secretary of State Hull. The presentation of the Hull Note, which effectively ended diplomatic negotiations on the outbreak of war, was taken by the Japanese side as an ultimatum, and at a conference in the presence of the Emperor on December 1st, they made the final decision to declare war on the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands, which led to the outbreak of war on the 8th. Later, the ultimatum in the negotiations gave rise to the problem of a delay in the announcement of the outbreak of war.

[Hiroaki Shiozaki]

"Japanese Diplomatic Documents: Japan-US Negotiations -- 1941, volumes 1 and 2 (1990), compiled and published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs " ▽ "Compilation of Records Related to Japan-US Negotiations, compiled by Hosoya Chihiro and Sato Motohide (2009, Genda Shiryo Publishing)" ▽ "Historical Materials on Igawa Tadao's Japan-US Negotiations, compiled by Ito Takashi and Shiozaki Hiroaki (1982, Yamakawa Publishing)" ▽ "The Crossroads of the Anglo-Japanese War, by Shiozaki Hiroaki (1984, Yamakawa Publishing)"

Source: Shogakukan Encyclopedia Nipponica About Encyclopedia Nipponica Information | Legend

対米英戦争の回避または延引を目的とした、真珠湾攻撃前の約1年間、日米両国で行われた非公式外交工作および開戦外交交渉。日中戦争の拡大とともに日米関係は険悪化し、アメリカは1939年（昭和14）日米通商航海条約廃棄通告をはじめ、1940年日本の北部仏印進駐(ふついんしんちゅう)や日独伊三国同盟締結に対する経済制裁、1941年対日資産凍結や石油の対日輸出全面禁止の措置（対日禁輸問題）に出た。この情勢を背景に1941年第2次近衛文麿(このえふみまろ)内閣は日米交渉を開始するが、交渉前史は1940年夏、アメリカ・カトリック外国宣教会のドラウトらによる対日和平工作に始まる。同年11月に来日したドラウトは、井川忠雄（産業組合中央金庫理事）を介して日本政府や軍部に、また翌1941年1月帰米後にはウォーカー郵政長官を介してホワイトハウスに通ずる非公式の外交チャンネルの成立を図る。同年4月、ドラウト・井川らによって、三国同盟の反米的性格を薄めた日米諒解案(にちべいりょうかいあん)が作成され、以後この案を基に、野村吉三郎(きちさぶろう)駐米大使とハル国務長官を軸に政府間レベルで外交交渉が行われる。しかし、日本側では松岡洋右(ようすけ)外相が諒解案に反対し、アメリカも独ソ開戦後のヨーロッパ情勢の変化と日本の南部仏印進駐に対して態度を硬化させ、交渉は頓挫する。その後局面打開のために、近衛はルーズベルトとの日米巨頭会談を提案するが実現せず、日本は和戦両様の構えで帝国国策遂行要領を決め、11月6日に交渉最終案「甲乙両案」を決定した。この提案は、米国務長官ハルが提示した26日付のハル・ノートによって拒否される。開戦外交交渉の事実上の打切りとなったこのハル・ノートの提示を、最後通牒と受け止めた日本側は、12月1日の御前会議で対米英蘭開戦を最終的に決断し、8日開戦に至る。のちに交渉の最終通告をめぐり開戦通告遅延問題を惹起する。

［塩崎弘明］

『外務省編・刊『日本外交文書・日米交渉――1941』上下（1990）』▽『細谷千博・佐藤元秀編『日米交渉関係調書集成』（2009・現代史料出版）』▽『伊藤隆・塩崎弘明編『井川忠雄日米交渉史料』（1982・山川出版社）』▽『塩崎弘明著『日英米戦争の岐路』（1984・山川出版社）』

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