Tokyo Electric Power Company [Co]

Japanese: 東京電力[株] - とうきょうでんりょく

Abbreviated as TEPCO. Its predecessor was Tokyo Electric Light Co., Ltd. (Japan's first electric power company), established in 1883. It was established in 1951 when it took over the business of Kanto Electric Power Distribution Co., Ltd. and Japan Electric Power Transmission Co., Ltd. (part of the company) during the reorganization of the electric power industry. It is one of the nine electric power companies. Its supply area covers the entire Kanto region, Yamanashi Prefecture, and Shizuoka Prefecture east of the Fuji River. It has 189 hydro-thermal and nuclear power plants, including the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant, and its maximum power output of 64.3 million kW (2001) and sales of 280.2 billion kWh (2009) are both among the largest among private electric power companies in the world. Its nuclear power plants are the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, which straddles Okuma Town and Futaba Town in Fukushima Prefecture's Futaba District, and the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Plant, which straddles Tomioka Town and Naraha Town in the same district (units 1 to 4, started operation from 1982 to 1987, all boiling water reactors). It owns three nuclear power plants outside the TEPCO business area: the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant, which straddles Kashiwazaki City in Niigata Prefecture and Kariwa Town in Kariwa District. All nuclear power plants have been shut down since the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. The new standards proposed by the Nuclear Regulation Authority in April 2013 (implemented in July of the same year) include strict requirements for severe accident countermeasures and earthquake and tsunami countermeasures, and if active faults are found directly beneath a nuclear power plant, construction itself will be prohibited. TEPCO plans to conduct fault surveys on the premises of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant Units 6 and 7 in preparation for their restart, and has applied to the Nuclear Regulation Authority for a conformity review of regulatory standards. In February 2014, the Nuclear Regulation Authority began an investigation into whether TEPCO's plan is appropriate. It will check survey points around the site and observe the topography. Within the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant site, in addition to Units 6 and 7, there are several faults running directly beneath important facilities such as the reactor building. If these faults are active faults that moved after 120,000 to 130,000 years ago, the nuclear power plant cannot be restarted. The Nuclear Regulation Authority has decided to investigate in detail whether the fault is active as part of its review, and TEPCO is also investigating, but as of April 2015, no conclusion has been reached. Although Niigata Prefecture Governor Hirohiko Izumida has accepted TEPCO's application to restart the plant, he has consistently refused to allow it to be restarted, citing insufficient investigations into the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident by TEPCO. On March 11, 2011, the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was triggered by a massive tsunami caused by the Tohoku Pacific Ocean Earthquake, which led to the Great East Japan Earthquake, and suffered one of the worst nuclear accidents in the history of nuclear power plants (severe nuclear accidents), shocking the world. The release of radioactive material is estimated to be 370,000 or 630,000 terabecquerels, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has rated the severity of the accident as INES Level 7, comparable to the Chernobyl nuclear accident. The direct cause of the accident was the total loss of power, due to the tsunami height, earthquake intensity, and maximum acceleration all being far above TEPCO's design values. However, it was clear that TEPCO's accident management after the accident was flawed, and TEPCO's attitude of disclosure and accountability as a party involved was also severely questioned. TEPCO's responsibility was pointed out as extremely significant, from the design to the response after the accident. The government established the Accident Investigation Committee in the Cabinet Secretariat in May. Furthermore, the Diet also launched the National Diet Accident Investigation Committee, which has the authority to conduct interviews and request the submission of documents from business entities such as TEPCO and administrative agencies including the Cabinet. However, both the government and Diet committee investigation reports are hindered by the chaotic situation at the time of the accident, the vague understanding of the situation by TEPCO and the government, and the lack of awareness of the parties involved in the accident, and it is difficult to say that they have clarified the entire picture of this unprecedented severe accident. In particular, TEPCO's tendency to cover up the truth should be severely criticized. Furthermore, in April 2013, one year and four months after the announcement of the end of the accident in December 2011, Tokyo Electric Power Company shocked the world by announcing that a large amount of highly contaminated water containing strontium and other elements had leaked from an underground water tank at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. The amount of the leak was estimated at about 120 tons, with about 710 billion becquerels of radiation. TEPCO explained that there was no leakage into the ocean, but Fukushima Prefecture demanded that the cause be investigated, that thorough measures be taken to prevent recurrence, and that a thorough investigation be made into the environmental impact. In April 2014, it was discovered that about 200 tons of highly contaminated water had been mistakenly sent to a building other than the one it was supposed to be in, and the Nuclear Regulation Authority instructed TEPCO to strengthen monitoring. Fukushima Prefecture Governor Yuhei Sato has harshly criticized the fact that more than 200 incidents have occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in the three years since the nuclear accident, and that it is no exaggeration to say that risk management is extremely sloppy. The Nuclear Accident Compensation System provides that operators are exempt from liability in the event of damages caused by an abnormally large natural disaster, but the Democratic Party and Kan administration denied the application of the exemption clause, and said that TEPCO bears primary responsibility for compensation, and that compensation to the victims is the responsibility of TEPCO. TEPCO is being called upon to carry out thorough restructuring, and shareholders have also been blamed. However, the government, which has made nuclear power the basis of its energy policy and has promoted nuclear power generation for many years, cannot escape responsibility either. In order to smoothly proceed with compensation for this accident, the government established the Nuclear Damage Compensation Review Board in April 2011, and further established the Nuclear Damage Compensation Support Corporation in September 2011, and decided to deal with compensation for damages that are expected to amount to several trillion yen. It has also been pointed out that TEPCO will need 20 trillion yen in future expenses to deal with the aftermath of the accident, apart from compensation for damages. In July 2012, the Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation completed its investment of 1 trillion yen in Tokyo Electric Power Company, which resulted in the corporation gaining control of 50.11% of the voting power of Tokyo Electric Power Company, essentially nationalizing the company. Following the Great East Japan Earthquake and the nuclear accident, Tokyo Electric Power Company implemented planned power outages in March and April 2011. Capital in 2011 was 900.9 billion yen, and sales for the fiscal year ending March 2011 were 5,368.5 billion yen. Consolidated total assets were 14,255.9 billion yen. Extraordinary losses were recorded of 1,700 billion yen, resulting in a huge net profit and loss for the period of approximately 1,200 billion yen. Sales breakdown (%): electricity 98%, information and communications 2, and others. → Electricity business / Nuclear power generation / Nuclear industry / Nuclear accident → Related topics Anesaki [power plant] | Imaichi [power plant] | Kashima [power plant] | Kandenko [stock] | Shin-Takasegawa [power plant] | Power saving | Sodegaura [power plant] | Tamahara [power plant] | Tokai No. 2 Nuclear Power Plant | Nippon Light Metal [stock] | Higashidori Nuclear Power Plant | Hiraiwa Gaiyo | Hirono [power plant] | Fukushima No. 2 Nuclear Power Plant | Futtsu [power plant] | Yokohama [power plant] | Masao Yoshida

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Japanese:

略称東電。1883年設立の東京電灯（日本最初の電力会社）が前身。1951年電力再編成で関東配電・日本発送電（一部）の事業を継承して設立。９電力会社の一つ。供給区域は関東一円と山梨および富士川以東の静岡。福島原子力発電所など水火原子力189の発電所をもち，最大電力6430万kW（2001年），販売電力量2802億kWh（2009年度）はともに民間電力企業で世界最大級。原子力発電所は，福島県双葉郡大熊町と双葉町にまたがる福島第一原発，同郡富岡町と楢葉町にまたがる福島第二原発（１〜４号機，1982年〜87年運転開始，いずれも沸騰水型軽水炉）。新潟県柏崎市と刈羽郡刈羽町にまたがる柏崎刈羽原発の三ヵ所で，東京電力の事業地域でない場所に保有している。福島第一原発事故後，すべての原発が稼働を停止している。2013年４月に示された原子力規制委員会の新基準案（同年７月より実施）では，過酷事故対策，地震・津波対策について厳しい要求がなされており，原発直下に活断層の存在が認められれば建設そのものを禁止するとされた。東京電力は柏崎刈羽原発６号機，７号機の再稼働に向け敷地内などで断層調査を計画し，原子力規制委員会に規制基準の適合審査を申請。2014年２月原子力規制委員会は，東京電力の計画が妥当であるか否か調査を開始した。敷地周辺の調査地点を確認したり，地形などを観察したりする。柏崎刈羽原発の敷地内には，６，７号機のほか，複数の断層が原子炉建屋など重要施設の直下を走っている。これらの断層が12万〜13万年前以降に動いた活断層であれば，原発は再稼働できない。原子力規制委員会は審査の一環として活断層かどうかを詳しく調べることにしており，東電側も調査しているが，2015年４月段階でも結論は出ていない。泉田裕彦新潟県知事は東京電力の再稼働申請は容認したものの，一貫して東京電力の福島第一原発事故検証が不十分として再稼働を認めていない。2011年３月11日，福島第一原発は，東日本大震災をもたらした東北地方太平洋沖地震による大津波をきっかけに，原発史上最悪の大事故（原子力過酷事故）の一つを起こし，世界を震撼させる事態となった。放射性物質の放出は，37万テラベクレルもしくは63万テラベクレルと推定され，国際原子力機関IAEAは事故の深刻度をチェルノブイリ原発事故に匹敵するINESレベル７とした。津波の高さ，地震の震度・最大加速度とも東京電力の設計値を大きく上回ったことによる全電源喪失が大事故の直接の原因だが，事故発生後の東京電力のアクシデントマネジメントに不備があったことは明らかで，さらに当事者としての情報開示，説明責任の姿勢も厳しく問われた。設計から事故発生後の対応まで，東京電力の責任はきわめて重大なものと指摘された。政府は，５月内閣官房に〈事故調査委員会〉を設置した。さらに国会も，国会が主体となって東京電力などの事業体や内閣を含む行政機関などから聞き取り調査や資料提出を求める権限を持つ〈国会事故調査委員会〉を発足させた。しかし政府・国会の委員会調査報告はともに，事故発生当時の混乱状況，東京電力，国の状況把握の曖昧さ，事故当事者意識の欠如等々の壁に阻まれ，未曾有の過酷事故の全体像の解明となっているとは言い難い。とりわけ東京電力の隠蔽体質は厳しく批判されるべきであろう。さらに，2011年12月の事故収束宣言から１年４ヵ月後の2013年４月，東京電力は，福島第一原発内の地下貯水槽からストロンチウムなどを含む高濃度汚染水が大量に漏出したと発表して衝撃を与えた。漏れた量は推定約120トン，放射能は約7100億ベクレルとしている。東京電力は海洋に流出はない，と説明したが，福島県は原因究明，再発防止策の徹底，環境の影響への徹底調査を求めた。2014年４月には約200トンの高濃度汚染水が本来と違う建屋に誤って送水されていたことが判明，原子力規制委員会は東京電力に監視強化を指示した。佐藤雄平・福島県知事は，福島第一原発では原発事故から３年でトラブルが200回以上起こり，リスク管理がきわめてずさんと言っても過言ではないと厳しく指摘している。原子力災害補償制度は，異常に巨大な天災地変で損害が生じた場合，事業者は責任を免れるとの規定を設けているが，民主党・菅政権は免責条項の適用を否定，東京電力に賠償の面で第一義的な責任があるとし，被害者への賠償責任は東京電力にあるとした。東京電力には徹底的なリストラが求められ，株主の責任も指摘された。とはいえ原発をエネルギー政策の基本に据え，長年原発振興を推進してきた国も責任を免れず，政府はこの事故にともなう賠償を円滑にすすめるため，2011年４月原子力損害賠償審査会を設置，さらに2011年９月，原子力損害賠償支援機構を設立して，数兆円にのぼると予想される損害賠償に対応することを決めた。損害賠償とは別に，東京電力は事故後の処理に今後20兆円の費用を必要とするという指摘もなされている。2012年７月原子力損害賠償支援機構は，東京電力への１兆円の出資を完了，この結果，同機構が東京電力の議決権の50.11％を握ることとなり，実質国有化された。なお，東京電力は，大震災と原発事故にともない，2011年３月〜４月に計画停電を実施した。2011年資本金9009億円，2011年３月期売上高５兆3685億円。連結総資産14兆2559億円。特別損失１兆7000億円を計上し，当期純損益は約１兆2000億円という巨額にのぼった。売上構成（％）は，電気98，情報・通信他２。→電気事業／原子力発電／原子力産業／原発事故
→関連項目姉崎［発電所］｜今市［発電所］｜鹿島［発電所］｜関電工［株］｜新高瀬川［発電所］｜節電｜袖ヶ浦［発電所］｜玉原［発電所］｜東海第二原発｜日本軽金属［株］｜東通原発｜平岩外四｜広野［発電所］｜福島第二原発｜富津［発電所］｜横浜［発電所］｜吉田昌郎

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