There are qualitative and quantitative definitions of small and medium-sized enterprises. Qualitative definitions refer to the case where small and medium-sized enterprises are understood as the problems that large enterprises are facing at a certain time in a certain country. However, on the other hand, there may be a need to distinguish quantitatively due to government policies and other needs, and the quantitative classification changes according to the development of the country's economy. In Japan today, unless otherwise specified, small and medium-sized enterprises are defined quantitatively as corporations with capital of 300 million yen or less or with 300 employees or less, or individual enterprises with 300 employees or less, based on the definition in the Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Act (Act No. 154 of 1963). However, in the case of wholesale, the standard is capital of 100 million yen or less or with 100 employees or less, in the case of service industry, capital of 50 million yen or less or with 100 employees or less, and in the case of retail industry, capital of 50 million yen or less or with 50 employees or less. Additionally, small and medium-sized enterprises with 20 or fewer employees are sometimes referred to as "small-scale enterprises." However, in the commercial or service industries, the standard for a "small-scale enterprise" is one with five or fewer employees. In general, enterprises with four or fewer employees are sometimes referred to as "microenterprises" or "micro-management." However, if a distinction is made solely based on quantitative criteria, some enterprises with the same number of employees, for example in the process industry such as the chemical industry, would be considered large enterprises, and the standard for distinction may shift depending on the nature of the industry. In other countries, the criteria are not the same as in Japan. For example, in the United States, small businesses are classified as those with 500 or fewer employees, but the criteria are based on the number of employees and sales depending on the industry. Also, qualitative criteria such as "independently owned" and "not dominant in the business field" are also adopted, which is different from Japan. Similarly, in the European Union (EU), the criteria are fewer than 250 employees, annual sales of 40 million euros or less, or an annual balance sheet (total assets) of 27 million euros or less, and not more than 25% of the capital or management rights are held by one or more other companies. [Yoshiro Miwa and Kazuhide Yawata] The status of Japanese small and medium-sized enterprisesIn 2001, the total number of business establishments in Japan's non-primary industries (secondary and tertiary industries combined) was 99.2%, of which 76.6% were small-scale businesses, making it an overwhelming 99.2%. In manufacturing, by employee size, in 1997, small-scale businesses accounted for 99.0% of business establishments, 75.0% of employees, and 50.8% of shipment value. In the wholesale industry, the proportion of small-scale businesses was 99.2% of the number of stores, 83.6% of the number of employees, and 64.2% of annual sales value in 1997, and in retail the proportions were 99.2%, 83.7%, and 75.7%. In any case, small-scale businesses are overwhelmingly more numerous. However, since 1990, the number of small-scale businesses has been declining, particularly in the manufacturing and wholesale/retail industries, with the decline being particularly notable among micro-businesses with 10 or fewer employees. Looking at the sectors by type of manufacturing where small and medium-sized enterprises occupy a particularly high position, firstly, there is the light industry sector, such as food, textiles, clothing and other textile products, lumber and wooden products, furniture and equipment, and secondly, the intermediate goods production sector of the processing and assembly industry, where small and medium-sized enterprises often act as subcontractors to large enterprises to supply parts, and there is a division of labor. Such size-based characteristics of industries and sectors are not unique to Japan. In addition, depending on the industry and product, there are many unique areas for small and medium-sized enterprises depending on the technological level, mass production scale, capital equipment ratio, demand structure and other characteristics. [Yoshiro Miwa and Kazuhide Yawata] Characteristics of the problems facing small and medium-sized enterprises in Japan after the Second World WarAs we have seen, small and medium-sized enterprises make up an overwhelming number in Japan, but the fact that they are so numerous is not the only problem. There are some differences in the West as well, but the fact remains that there are a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises. After the Second World War, Japan's industrial structure was characterized by what Hiromi Arisawa metaphorically called the "dual structure of the Japanese economy." In other words, on the one hand, there are huge monopoly companies linked to state capital, and on the other, there are pre-modern, backward small and medium-sized enterprises and agriculture, and there is a fault line between them. The 1955 (Showa 30) Economic Planning Agency (now the Cabinet Office) Economic White Paper took up this "dual structure theory," and stated that the elimination of this dual structure was the biggest challenge to modernizing the Japanese economy. A clear expression of this dual structure of the economy was the extraordinary size of the wage disparity between companies in Japan. Comparing the wage disparity per person by business size (manufacturing industry) between Japan and the United States, in 1955, if the average wage of business establishments with 1,000 or more employees was taken as 100%, in Japan the figure was already 65% for those with 100-499 employees (83% in the United States), and 39% for those with 10-19 employees (74% in the United States). Moreover, this figure included work done at home and on farms. It was not just the wage gap. There were long working hours, poor working conditions and facilities, inadequate welfare facilities, and unstable employment, all of which could be described as a "dual structure." These were the very characteristics of Japanese capitalism. [Yoshiro Miwa and Kazuhide Yawata] The high growth of the postwar Japanese economy up to the 1960s and the transformation of small and medium-sized enterprisesHowever, starting around 1955, the Japanese economy achieved a period of ultra-high growth throughout the 1960s that was rare in the world. During this period of high growth, Japan's industrial structure and the problems of small and medium-sized enterprises also underwent major changes. For example, comparing wage disparities by size between Japan and the United States, in 1965, the wage disparity by size was exactly the same in both countries at 74% for establishments with 100-499 employees, and 56% in Japan and 69% in the United States for establishments with 10-19 employees. Although there was still some difference, this was a "qualitative" disparity of 39 to 74 in 1955, but by 1965 the difference between Japan and the United States had changed drastically to the point where it was merely "quantitative." The factors behind this are the three major postwar economic democratization policies, namely land reform, freedom of unionization, and the dissolution of the zaibatsu, and political reform, namely the reform of the political and economic framework of the democratic constitution, particularly its Article 9, which renounces disarmament. As a result of this transformation of the basic economic framework, income equalization, invigorated competition between companies, and the loss of "master-Japanese" demand, which was military demand, can be said to have brought about high growth from around 1955, when the postwar reconstruction period had come about, fueled by the special procurements made during the Korean War. In other words, it was a consumer revolution on the one hand, and technological progress and a boom in capital investment on the other. The progress of the consumer revolution led to radios, sewing machines, washing machines, televisions, refrigerators, and eventually to color televisions and automobiles. There, for the first time in Japan, the establishment of a mass-production mechanical industry was seen, and the mechanical industry was able to stand on its own two feet alongside the equipment and machinery industry using the single-item production method. This made mass production of parts inevitable, and even for small and medium-sized parts companies, line work became simple and light, leading to collaboration through division of labor, and especially the massive absorption of young labor. As a result, around 1961, the supply and demand of labor reversed, and the shortage of young labor became particularly noticeable, leading to an increase in the wages of young workers. This reversal of the supply and demand of labor was truly epoch-making in the history of Japanese capitalism, which lasted for about 100 years. The labor shortage was particularly serious for small and medium-sized enterprises, and forced them to raise wages. Naturally, the wage increase forced them to make labor-saving capital investments, and became an incentive for small and medium-sized enterprises to modernize their facilities. Furthermore, in the latter half of the 1960s, the above factors brought about the penetration of the materials revolution down to the very edge of small and medium-sized enterprises. In fact, technological innovation took the form of a materials revolution and reached the very edge of small and medium-sized enterprises. For example, the sudden expansion of plastics, replacing wood and paper, into everyday items, building materials, packaging, toys, and so on, led to the replacement of traditional handicraft processing methods with mass-production plastic injection molding machines and blow molding (a method of producing plastic bottles). In this way, major changes occurred, such as the elimination of wholesale capital (advance capital), which employed craftsmen to produce small quantities seasonally, but which then changed to a continuous production method using simple and light labor. In other words, until around 1960, technological innovation was centered on large companies responsible for producing raw materials. For example, steel, petrochemicals, electricity, and synthetic fiber raw materials. However, in the 1960s, through the materials revolution, technological innovation began to permeate down to the edge of small and medium-sized processing companies. Labor shortages and rising wages at small and medium-sized enterprises promoted a shift to materials and processing equipment that were labor-saving, easy to mass-produce, and possible to make lightweight and compact. If the first factor in the transformation of small and medium-sized enterprises in the 1960s was labor shortages and rising wages, as mentioned above, the second factor was the internationalization of the Japanese economy. The waves of trade liberalization and capital liberalization called for the modernization of parts companies in the processing and assembly industries, while at the same time, the granting of preferential tariffs, under which imports from developing countries are tax-free or subject to low tariffs, led to a demand for modernization in industries (mainly labor-intensive light industrial products and textile products) that were being caught up by developing countries. It is also worth noting that the high growth and market expansion up until the 1960s led to the emergence of new groups of companies, such as parts specialist manufacturers and so-called "medium-sized companies," among small and medium-sized Japanese companies, which had not previously developed. These changes in the machinery industry have spread to other industries and have even transformed the distribution process. [Yoshiro Miwa and Kazuhide Yawata] The shift to low growth since the 1970s and small and medium-sized enterprisesIn the early 1970s, the Japanese economy shifted to a period of low growth. The first reason for this was that the stock of durable goods, such as durable consumer goods, equipment and machinery, and social capital, had become enormous and their popularity had reached a plateau, causing the annual growth rate of production and consumption flows to suddenly slow down and become distorted. The second reason was that this was overlapped by the appreciation of the yen and the oil shock. The shift to low growth in the Japanese economy also brought new changes to small and medium-sized enterprises. First, looking at the trend in wage disparities, the turning point was around 1965, and since then the wage disparity has plateaued at around 80%, but has instead moved slightly wider. However, this is 80% for large companies with 1000 or more employees, and is roughly 70% after adjusting for annual bonuses, so it cannot be said that the disparity is large compared to Europe and the United States. In other words, while the wage gap in Japan in 1955 could be said to be a "Japanese characteristic," the gap today is not so much Japanese, but has changed to the wage gap between large and small companies that exists in capitalist economies in general. Of course, if we look more closely at the content of the gap, rather than looking at the average, we can see that there are many disparities, and today, with low growth becoming prolonged and established, the gap is rather showing a different form and tending to widen. The oil crisis of 1973 triggered another sudden deterioration in the labor supply and demand, and the sense of labor shortage in small and medium-sized enterprises rapidly subsided. In the midst of this, companies have been increasing their reliance on female and part-time workers in order to seek lower wages. In particular, as low growth has led to the stagnation and recession of the manufacturing industry and a trend toward growth only in the tertiary industry, the increase in the number of women, part-time workers, and student part-timers in the tertiary industry has been remarkable. In addition, when looking at standard workers, adjusted for attributes such as age, years of service, occupation, and educational background rather than averages, there is not much wage disparity up until the mid-30s, but the wage gap widens as people get older, regardless of occupation or educational background. Regarding working hours, according to the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (1983) conducted by the Ministry of Labor (now the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare), the actual scheduled working hours per month (for manufacturing, men, and total educational background) at small and medium-sized enterprises was 192 hours, 1.16 times that of large enterprises (165 hours), showing a large disparity. The disparity has since narrowed, and in the 1999 survey it was 160 hours at large enterprises, 166 hours at medium-sized enterprises, and 173 hours at small enterprises. [Yoshiro Miwa and Kazuhide Yawata] The International Industrial Restructuring Process in the 1980s and Small and Medium-sized EnterprisesIn the 1980s, the number of small and medium-sized enterprises that lost their competitiveness due to a rapid increase in exports and a sudden appreciation of the yen further increased, while a large current account surplus and intensifying trade friction encouraged Japanese companies to establish local factories overseas. These phenomena pushed domestic small and medium-sized parts manufacturers into even greater difficulties through the obligation to procure parts and materials locally. The 1980s also saw the development of microelectronics (ME), known as the semiconductor revolution, which helped small and medium-sized enterprises to modernize their facilities while also enabling large companies to enter the field of high-mix, low-volume production. Thus, as a result of the low growth of the Japanese economy, Japan's machinery industry, with its domestic demand sluggish, has become so dependent on exports that almost half of its production is now dependent on exports, and machinery product exports account for over 70% of Japan's total exports. Japan's machinery exports became the largest in the world, which was the main cause of a large trade surplus and thus a strong yen. What made this decisive was the Plaza Accord of 1985. Policy coordination among advanced capitalist countries led to a permanent situation of a strong yen and a weak dollar. In order to ease trade friction, large automobile, television, VTR and other machinery companies are moving to Western developed countries to set up local production plants in search of markets for their large products, while at the same time promoting the creation of de facto international cartels in the name of voluntary export volume restraints, thereby increasing profits through higher prices. On the other hand, for low-priced products such as radios, sewing machines, small televisions and others, production bases are being moved to Southeast Asian countries in search of low wages there. Thus, if domestic production heads toward shrinking, it is only natural that the difficulties of related parts manufacturers and subcontractors will intensify. A strong yen weakens the export competitiveness of labor-intensive light industrial products, and many small and medium-sized enterprises that have not traditionally been involved in exports will often find themselves losing markets to increased imports of foreign products. Thus, under international industrial restructuring policies, new contradictions arose between small and medium-sized enterprises and large corporations in terms of both sluggish domestic demand and exports and imports. However, the "bubble economy" that began in 1987 concealed these contradictions, and an unprecedented economic boom engulfed the Japanese economy, but the contradictions became apparent within about five years. [Yoshiro Miwa and Kazuhide Yawata] Small and Medium-sized Enterprises under the 1990s Recession and Deregulation PolicyThe "1990s recession" occurred in 1992 (Heisei 4) due to the collapse of the bubble economy, and contradictions that had been hidden until then suddenly began to erupt. In addition, deregulation policies based on the Japan-US Structural Initiative began in earnest in Japan in 1995, creating an environment in which large companies, both domestic and foreign, could easily enter industries that had previously been the domain of small and medium-sized enterprises. Large companies implemented large-scale "restructuring" (reconstruction, rebuilding) including employee transfers by fully transferring mass and medium-sized product production to overseas production bases with new facilities and downsizing and closing old domestic factories, and naturally transactions with subcontracting small and medium-sized enterprises in the region were also reduced or terminated. SMEs also reduced their workforce through restructuring, with the expectation that they should "learn from the large companies," increasing the number of unemployed people in each region. Bankruptcies and closures are increasing among small and medium-sized enterprises at the lower levels, and even local economies are in a steep decline as the "hollowing out of regions" is being called for. The Large-Scale Retail Store Law, which had been weakened by three relaxations of regulations since 1990, was abolished in the ordinary Diet session in 1998. Since then, the rush to open large stores such as supermarkets and specialty store chains has not only continued unabated, but is also accelerating the decline of small and medium-sized retail businesses in local areas. In the manufacturing industry, not only are large supplier companies relocating overseas, but policy is also encouraging small and medium-sized enterprises to change their business practices and expand overseas. As a result, the number of factories is decreasing not only in company towns but also in local industries and urban industrial clusters, and distortions are beginning to appear in regional production networks (regional division of labor systems). The Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law was revised in 1999, and small and medium enterprise policy is now shifting to one that places a greater emphasis on supporting management innovation, start-ups, and venture businesses. However, when considering small and medium enterprises as a whole, it is clear that policy support for only these outstanding small and medium enterprises is not enough. For SMEs in the 21st century, transforming into cutting-edge, front-runner types of businesses will enable the public to enjoy the benefits of the various functions that SMEs offer, and will be the first step towards creating an affluent society. It is important to halt the ongoing collapse of SME clusters in various regions and to maintain and develop SMEs as the backbone of local economies and societies. For example, in the manufacturing industry, rather than trying to restore the quality and quantity of clusters of local production areas and local industries that are subcontractors to large companies and have difficulty breaking away from traditional product manufacturing, it is more important to build a mechanism for the clustering of "new" SMEs. Of course, the products produced by these "new" clusters will provide the public with an affluent society. [Yoshiro Miwa and Kazuhide Yawata] "Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Theory," edited by Fujita Keizo and Takeuchi Masami (1972, Yuhikaku) " ▽ "Basic Courses on Modern Small and Medium-sized Enterprises," edited by Kato Seiichi, Mizuno Takeshi, and Kobayashi Yasuo, 5 volumes (1976-77, Doyukan)" ▽ "Theories and Policies for the Modernization of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises," by Nakayama Kinji (1983, Chikura Shobo)" ▽ "Theories and Movements of Japanese Small and Medium-sized Enterprises," by Watanabe Mutsumi (1991, Shinnihon Shuppansha)" ▽ "Small and Medium-sized Enterprises at a Turning Point," by Yoshida Keiichi (1996, Shinhyoron)" ▽ "Summary and Proposals for Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Policy," by Kurose Naohiro (1997, Doyukan)" ▽ "Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Research Institute," edited by Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Research Institute (Modern Japan's Small and Medium-sized Enterprises -- Current Situation and Outlook) (1999, Shinnihon Shuppansha)" ▽ " Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Research Institute," edited by Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Research Institute (Modern Japan's Small and Medium-sized Enterprises -- International Comparison and Policy) (2000, Shinnihon Shuppansha)" ▽ "21st Century Small and Medium Enterprise Theory - Exploring Diversity and Possibilities" by Watanabe Yukio et al. (2001, Yuhikaku)" ▽ "International Comparison of Small and Medium Enterprises" by Fukushima Hisakazu (2002, Shinhyoron)" ▽ "21st Century Regional Social Revitalization and Small and Medium Enterprises" edited by the Japan Society for Small and Medium Enterprise Studies (2002, Doyukan)" ▽ "Regional Economic Theory of Industrial Clusters - Small and Medium Enterprise Networks and Urban Renewal" by Kamakura Ken (2002, Keiso Shobo)" ▽ "New Edition: Contemporary Small and Medium Enterprises" by Aida Toshio et al. (2002, Sofusha)" ▽ "Global Economy and Small and Medium Enterprises" edited by Uchida Katsutoshi (2002, Sekaishisosha)" ▽ "Sociology of Small and Medium Enterprises - Another Theory of Japanese Society" by Teraoka Hiroshi (2002, Shinzansha Publishing)" ▽ "Small and Medium Enterprise Agency Edited 'Management Indicators for Small and Medium Enterprises' Annual Edition (Small and Medium Enterprise Management Association, published by Doyukan)" ▽ "Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, 'White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises', various years' editions (Printing Bureau of the Ministry of Finance/Printing Bureau of the Ministry of Finance. From the 2001 edition, Gyosei)" [Reference items] | | | | | | | |Source: Shogakukan Encyclopedia Nipponica About Encyclopedia Nipponica Information | Legend |
中小企業の定義には、質的なものと量的なものがある。質的には、ある国のある時期に、大企業に対し中小企業が問題になっているものとして理解する場合のものである。しかし他面、政府の政策その他の必要から量的に区別する必要も生ずるし、その量的区分もその国の経済の発展に応じて変化する。現在の日本では、とくに断らない限り、中小企業基本法(昭和38年法律154号)の定義に基づき、量的に、資本金3億円以下または従業員300人以下の法人企業または従業員300人以下の個人企業を中小企業としている。ただし、卸売業の場合には資本金1億円以下または従業員100人以下、サービス業の場合には資本金5000万円以下または従業員100人以下を、小売業では資本金5000万円以下または従業員50人以下を基準としている。 また、中小企業のうち従業員20人以下の企業を、とくに「小規模企業」とよぶこともある。ただし、商業またはサービス業での「小規模企業」とは従業員5人以下を基準としている。一般に、4人以下の企業をとくに「零細企業・零細経営」とよぶこともある。ただ、量的基準のみで一律に区別すると、同じ従業員規模でも、たとえば化学工業のような装置産業では大企業に属するものもあるから、業種の性格により区別の基準が移動することもありうる。 外国の場合は日本と同一ではない。たとえば、アメリカではスモール・ビジネスsmall businessといい、従業員500人以下を中小企業と分類しているが、業種により従業員数や売上高を基準としている。また、「独立して所有されている」「事業分野で支配的でない」といった質的な基準も取り入れられている点は日本と異なる。同様に、ヨーロッパ連合(EU)では従業員数250人未満、年間売上高4000万ユーロ以下、または年次バランスシート(総資産額)2700万ユーロ以下で、他の一つないしは複数の企業に資本または経営権の25%以上を保有されていないことが基準となっている。 [三輪芳郎・八幡一秀] 日本の中小企業の地位2001年(平成13)の日本の非一次産業計(二次、三次産業の計)でみると、中小企業の事業所数は99.2%、うち76.6%を小規模企業が占めて圧倒的である。また、このうち製造業について従業員規模別にみると、1997年で、事業所数で99.0%、従業員数で75.0%、出荷額で50.8%を中小企業が占めている。卸売業でも中小企業比率は1997年で商店数の99.2%、従業員数の83.6%、年間販売額の64.2%で、小売業でも同じく99.2%、83.7%、75.7%である。いずれにしても、数のうえでは中小企業が圧倒的に多い。しかし、1990年以降中小企業は製造業、卸小売業を中心に減少し続けており、とくに10人以下規模の小零細層での減少が著しくなっている。 製造業のなかで中小企業がとくに高い地位を占めている分野を業種別にみると、第一に、食料品、繊維、衣服その他の繊維製品、木材・木製品、家具・装備品といった軽工業分野、第二に、加工組立て型業種の中間財生産分野で、ここでは中小企業は多くの場合、大企業の下請企業として部品提供を行っており、分業関係にある。このような業種分野の規模別特性は、日本のみの特性ではない。 また、業種や商品により、技術水準、量産規模、資本装備率、需要の構造その他の特性により、中小企業の独自の分野がかなり存在する。 [三輪芳郎・八幡一秀] 第二次世界大戦後の日本の中小企業問題の特質以上みたように、日本では中小企業が圧倒的な数を占めているが、数が多いことだけが問題なのではない。欧米諸国でもいくぶんの差はあるものの、中小企業の数が多いことに変わりはない。第二次世界大戦後、日本の産業構造は、有沢広巳(ひろみ)がその特質を「日本経済の二重構造」と比喩(ひゆ)的にいった点にある。つまり、一方に、国家資本と結び付いた巨大な独占企業が存在し、他方に、前近代的な遅れた中小企業、農業が存在し、そこに断層があるということである。1955年度(昭和30)の経済企画庁(現内閣府)『経済白書』がこの「二重構造論」を取り上げ、日本経済の近代化のためには、この二重構造の解消こそが最大の課題であるとした。 この経済の二重構造の端的な表現が、日本における企業規模別賃金格差の異常なまでの大きさであった。事業所規模別1人当り賃金格差(製造業)を日米で比較すると、1955年当時では、それぞれ1000人以上規模の事業所の平均賃金を100%とすると、日本では100~499人規模ですでに65%(アメリカは83%)、10~19人規模では39%(アメリカは74%)という状態であった。しかも、この下に家庭内職や農家の内職が結び付いていたのである。 賃金格差のみではない。長時間労働、作業環境・設備の劣悪さ、厚生施設の不備、就職の不安定性など、「二重構造」とよぶのにふさわしい状態にあった。まさに日本資本主義の特質であった。 [三輪芳郎・八幡一秀] 1960年代までの戦後日本経済の高成長と中小企業の変貌ところが、日本経済は1955年ごろを基点として、60年代を通じて、世界にもまれな超高度成長を遂げることとなった。この高度成長の過程で、日本の産業構造、また中小企業問題も大きな変容を遂げた。たとえば、規模別賃金格差の日米比較は、1965年には、従業員100~499人規模の事業所までは日米まったく同じの74%、10~19人規模でも日本は56%、アメリカは69%で、まだいくぶんの差はあるものの、それは1955年当時の39対74という、いわば「質的」格差に対し、65年当時には、その日米差は、いわば「量的」なそれにすぎないまでに急変しているのである。 この要因は、戦後の三大経済民主化政策、すなわち農地改革、労働組合結成の自由、財閥解体と、政治的改革、すなわち民主憲法、とりわけその第9条の軍備放棄という政治経済的枠組みの改革にある。この経済の基本的な枠組みの変革の結果、所得の平準化、企業間競争の活性化、軍需という「親方日の丸」的需要の喪失が、朝鮮特需をばねとし戦後復興期を経た1955年ごろからの高成長を引き出したといえる。すなわち、それは一方における消費革命であり、他方における技術進歩、設備投資の盛行である。 消費革命の進展は、ラジオ、ミシン、洗濯機、テレビ、冷蔵庫、やがてカラーテレビ、自動車へと大型化した。そこでは、日本で初めて、大量生産方式による機械工業の確立をみて、一品生産方式による設備機械工業とともに機械工業が両脚で立つこととなった。これは、部品の大量生産を必然化し、部品中小企業に至るまで、ラインの労働は単純労働化し、軽労働化し、分業による協業、とくに若年労働力の膨大な吸収をもたらした。この結果、1961年前後を境にして、労働力需給は逆転し、なかんずく若年労働力不足が顕著になり、若年工賃金の上昇をもたらした。この労働力需給の逆転は、日本資本主義約100年の歴史のなかで、まさに画期的なことであった。労働力不足はとくに中小企業に深刻で、中小企業の賃金上昇を余儀なくした。賃金上昇は、当然のこととして労働節約的設備投資を余儀なくし、中小企業の設備近代化の誘因となった。 さらに、1960年代後半には、以上のことが、中小企業の末端にまで材料革命の浸透をもたらした。いや、技術革新が材料革命という姿をとって、中小企業の末端にまで及んだのである。たとえば、木材、紙にかわりプラスチックが日用品、建材、包装、玩具(がんぐ)などへ急展開したことは、従来の手工業的加工法を、量産的なプラスチック射出成形機やブロー成形(プラスチックの瓶の生産方法)にかえていった。そこでは、従来は問屋資本(前貸資本)が職人を抱えて季節的な少量生産をさせて、買いたたいていたものが、連続的で、単純労働、軽労働による生産方式にかわり、問屋資本(前貸資本)を排除するなどの大きな変化が起こっていった。 つまり、1960年ごろまでは、技術革新は主として原材料生産を担う大企業中心のそれであった。たとえば鉄鋼、石油化学、電力、合成繊維原料などである。それが、60年代に至ると、材料革命を通じて、技術革新が中小加工企業の末端にまで浸透し始めたのである。中小企業の労働力不足、高賃金化が、労働節約的で量産的で、軽量化、小型化の可能な材料とその加工設備への転換を促進した。 1960年代の中小企業の変貌(へんぼう)の要因の第一を、前述のように、労働力不足、高賃金化とすれば、第二の要因は日本経済の国際化である。貿易自由化、資本自由化の波は、加工組立て産業での部品企業の近代化を要請すると同時に、他方、開発途上国からの輸入に対し無税または低関税率が適用される特恵関税供与によって、途上国からの追い上げを受ける業種(主として労働集約的な軽工業品や繊維製品など)での近代化が要請されるに至った。 1960年代までの高成長、市場の拡大は、日本の中小企業のなかに、それまで育たなかった部品専門メーカーや、いわゆる「中堅企業」とよばれる企業群を新たに群生させるに至ったことも特筆に値する。機械工業におけるこれらの変化を軸として、これは他の工業にも及び、また流通過程をも変貌させるに至った。 [三輪芳郎・八幡一秀] 1970年代以降の低成長への転化と中小企業1970年代初頭に、日本経済は、低成長へ転化した。その要因は、第一に、耐久消費財や設備機械や社会資本的なものなどの耐久財のストック(蓄積量)の巨大化、普及の一巡化により、フロー(流れ)の毎年の生産・消費の増加率が急激に鈍化屈折し始めたこと。第二に、円高や石油ショックがこれにオーバーラップしたことである。日本経済の低成長への転化は、また中小企業に新たな変化をもたらした。 まず賃金格差の推移をみると、1965年ごろを転機として、以後、賃金格差は80%前後で横ばい状態から、むしろやや開きぎみに推移している。しかし、これは、1000人以上規模の大企業に対し、10~99人規模の企業で80%、年間賞与等修正後格差でほぼ70%程度であるから、欧米と比べても格差が大きいとはいえまい。 つまり、1955年当時の日本の賃金格差はいわば「日本的特質」といえたが、今日の格差は、日本的というより、いわば資本主義経済一般に存在する大企業と中小企業の賃金格差という性格に変わったといえるのではないだろうか。もちろん、格差の内容を、平均ではなく、さらに詳しくみれば多くの格差が存在するし、低成長が長期化・定着化した今日、格差はむしろ形を変えた拡大傾向にあるといえる。 1973年の石油ショックを契機として、労働力需給はふたたび急転悪化し、中小企業における労働力不足感は急激に衰えた。そのなかで、より低賃金を求めて、企業は女性労働者やパートタイマー労働者への依存を強めている。とくに低成長が、製造業の停滞・後退、第三次産業のみの増大傾向をもたらすなかにあって、この第三次産業での女性、パート、あるいは学生アルバイトの増大が顕著となっている。 また、平均ではなく、年齢、勤続年数、職種、学歴という属性をそろえてみた標準労働者でみると、30歳なかばまでは賃金の格差はさほどないが、年齢が高くなるほど、職種、学歴に関係なく格差は広がっている。 労働時間も、労働省(現厚生労働省)「賃金構造基本統計調査」(1983)によると、中小企業の1か月当り所定内実労働時間(製造業、男子、学歴計)は192時間であり、大企業の165時間の1.16倍を示すなど、まだまだ格差は大きかった。その後、格差は縮まり、1999年(平成11)調査では、大企業160時間、中企業166時間、小企業173時間となった。 [三輪芳郎・八幡一秀] 1980年代の国際的産業構造調整過程と中小企業1980年代には、輸出の急増、急激な円高によって競争力を失う中小企業分野がいっそう拡大し、また経常収支の大幅黒字、貿易摩擦の激化は、日本企業の海外現地工場化を促進していた。これらの現象は、部品・資材の現地調達を義務づけられるなどのことを通じて、国内の部品中小企業をいっそう困難に追いやることになる。 また1980年代は、半導体革命とよばれるマイクロエレクトロニクス(ME)化が進展した。その結果として中小企業の設備近代化に役だつと同時に、大企業が多種中少量生産分野にまで参入可能となった。 このように、日本経済の低成長の結果、日本の機械工業は内需不振のもと、その生産のほぼなかばを輸出に依存するほど、輸出依存度を高め、日本の全輸出に占める機械製品輸出の割合も7割強に達している。機械輸出額は世界一に達し、これが主因となって、大幅な貿易黒字、したがって円高を招いた。これを決定的にしたのが、1985年の「プラザ合意」である。先進資本主義国による政策協調により、「円高・ドル安」が恒常化した。 自動車、テレビ、VTRその他の機械大企業は貿易摩擦緩和のため、欧米先進国には大型商品の市場を求めて現地生産工場化を進めると同時に、輸出数量自主規制の名のもとに事実上の国際カルテル化を進め、高価格化で利潤を高めている。他方、ラジオ、ミシン、小型テレビその他の低価格製品は、東南アジア諸国の低賃金を求めて、生産拠点をこれら地域に移している。かくして、国内生産が縮小の方向に向かうならば、関連部品、下請企業の困難は強まる道理である。 円高は、労働集約的軽工業品の輸出競争力を弱め、また、従来輸出とは関係がなかった多くの中小企業にとっても、外国製品の輸入増大によって市場を奪われる場合が多くなる。 このように、国際的産業構造調整政策の下で、内需不振と輸出・輸入の両面から、中小企業と大企業との間に新たな矛盾がいっそう激化した。しかし、1987年に始まる「バブル景気」はこれらの矛盾を隠蔽(いんぺい)し空前の好景気が日本経済を包み込むが、ほぼ5年で矛盾の顕在化をみることになった。 [三輪芳郎・八幡一秀] 90年代不況と規制緩和政策下における中小企業1992年(平成4)からバブル崩壊に伴う「90年代不況」が発生し、これまで隠蔽されてきた矛盾が一気に噴き出し始めた。また、95年から日米構造協議に基づいて国内で規制緩和政策推進が本格化し、これまで中小企業分野であった産業にも国内外の大企業が参入しやすい状況を政策的につくりだした。大企業は新規設備をもつ海外生産拠点への量産品・中量品生産の本格的移行と旧来の国内工場を縮小・閉鎖することにより従業員の配置転換を含む大規模な「リストラ」(リストラクチャリング、建て直し)を実施することとなり、その地域の下請中小企業との取引も縮小ないしは打ち切りが当然のように進んだ。「大企業に学べ」と中小企業でもリストラによる人員削減が行われ、各地域で失業者を増大させている。より下層に位置する、小零細企業では倒産・廃業が増加し、「地域の空洞化」が叫ばれるなか、地域経済までもが大きく傾いてきている。 1990年から3回の緩和政策により骨抜きとなった「大規模小売店舗法」は98年の通常国会において廃止が可決され、スーパーマーケットや専門店チェーンなど大型店の出店ラッシュはとどまるところを知らないばかりか、地域の中小小売業減少を加速させつつある。 製造業でも納入先大企業の海外移転だけでなく、中小企業の事業転換や海外展開が政策的に推進され、企業城下町地域だけでなく地場産業や都市型工業集積地域でも工場数減少が進み、地域内での生産ネットワーク(地域内分業体制)に歪(ゆが)みが現れてきている。 1999年に中小企業基本法が改正され、中小企業政策も経営革新・創業・ベンチャー企業への重点的支援政策へと転換しつつある。しかし、中小企業全体を考えるとき、これらの優良中小企業への政策支援だけでは不十分であることは明らかである。 21世紀の中小企業は、最先端をいくフロント・ランナー型体質へと転換していくことが、国民が中小企業のもつさまざまな機能から出てくる恩恵を享受できることにつながり、豊かな社会づくりへの第一歩となっていくだろう。各地域で進行しつつある中小企業集積の崩壊を食い止め、地域経済・社会の担い手としての中小企業を維持・発展させていくことが重要であるといえる。たとえば、製造業では大企業の下請として、また従来の製品作りからなかなか抜け出せない産地・地場産業の集積を質・量的に回復させることよりは、「新しい」中小零細企業の集積メカニズムを構築することこそが必要と考えられる。もちろん「新しい」集積からつくりだされる製品は豊かな社会を国民に提供するものとなる。 [三輪芳郎・八幡一秀] 『藤田敬三・竹内正巳編『中小企業論』(1972・有斐閣)』▽『加藤誠一・水野武・小林靖雄編『現代中小企業基礎講座』全5巻(1976~77・同友館)』▽『中山金治著『中小企業近代化の理論と政策』(1983・千倉書房)』▽『渡辺睦著『日本中小企業の理論と運動』(1991・新日本出版社)』▽『吉田敬一著『転機に立つ中小企業』(1996・新評論)』▽『黒瀬直宏著『中小企業政策の総括と提言』(1997・同友館)』▽『中小商工業研究所編『現代日本の中小商工業――現状と展望編』(1999・新日本出版社)』▽『中小商工業研究所編『現代日本の中小商工業――国際比較と政策編』(2000・新日本出版社)』▽『渡辺幸男他著『21世紀中小企業論――多様性と可能性を探る』(2001・有斐閣)』▽『福島久一著『中小企業の国際比較』(2002・新評論)』▽『日本中小企業学会編『21世紀の地域社会活性化と中小企業』(2002・同友館)』▽『鎌倉健著『産業集積の地域経済論――中小企業ネットワークと都市再生』(2002・勁草書房)』▽『相田利雄他著『新版・現代の中小企業』(2002・創風社)』▽『内田勝敏編『グローバル経済と中小企業』(2002・世界思想社)』▽『寺岡寛著『中小企業の社会学――もうひとつの日本社会論』(2002・信山社出版)』▽『中小企業庁編『中小企業の経営指標』各年版(中小企業診断協会、同友館発売)』▽『中小企業庁編『中小企業白書』各年版(大蔵省印刷局/財務省印刷局。2001年版より、ぎょうせい)』 [参照項目] | | | | | | | |出典 小学館 日本大百科全書(ニッポニカ)日本大百科全書(ニッポニカ)について 情報 | 凡例 |
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