Deterrence - Deterrence

Deterrence generally means to intimidate others by appearing to use one's power, and to restrain them from taking a certain action. Considering that it affects the actions of others through the threat of punishment or sanctions, it can be said to be a variant of the exercise of power. This concept of deterrence was a phenomenon mainly seen in the nuclear strategies between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, in which the expansion and strengthening of one's own nuclear weapons as much as possible was intended to increase the ability to launch retaliatory attacks and to deter the other side from launching a preemptive attack. Therefore, a system of mutual nuclear deterrence existed between the United States and the Soviet Union, and a relationship was formed in which each side mutually deterred the use of nuclear weapons. In other words, it was a "balance of terror" in which each side was so afraid of the other side's attack that they possessed more nuclear weapons than the other side. As long as they could not be freed from the spell of this balance of terror, it was inevitable that nuclear weapons would be strengthened, and the result was that each side possessed the ability to kill the other side's citizens multiple times. Paradoxically, the possession of such capabilities created an even greater need to absolutely prevent the outbreak of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, and led to efforts to institutionalize crisis management mechanisms to prevent a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In the end, the deterrent mechanism between the two countries was effective in the sense that a nuclear war did not break out, but what is important in this case is that both sides are in a position to make rational calculations, such as gains and losses. If one side is willing to accept that an attack will lead to its own annihilation, the deterrent mechanism will not work. Deterrence requires a relationship of symmetrical forces that allows for rational calculations. Just as the Vietnamese liberation forces fought and won the Vietnam War, ignoring American threats and sanctions, deterrence is unlikely to work in asymmetrical relationships. In this sense, the continued attacks on the United States by Islamic fundamentalist extremists in response to repeated American threats, the persistence of a hardline stance seen under Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, and the challenging stance of the Kim Jong-il regime in North Korea through the resumption of nuclear development are examples that show the failure of deterrence due to asymmetry. Therefore, although it can be said that the missile defense concept that the United States considers to be part of its 21st century security strategy is based on the concept of deterrence, it must be said that it is of little practical effectiveness against hostile forces that are asymmetric with those of the United States.

[Aoki Kazuyoshi]

"Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control at a Turning Point," edited and published by the Japan Association of International Relations (1989)" ▽ "Strategic Analysis of East-West Relations, edited by Sato Seizaburo (1990, Japan Institute of International Affairs)" ▽ "Verification of Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Emperor's New Clothes, written by Robert D. Green, translated by Umebayashi Hiromichi and Abe Junko (2000, Kobunken)" ▽ "Testimony: The Century of Nuclear Deterrence: How Science and Politics Moved, written by Yoshida Fumihiko (2000, Asahi Shimbun)" ▽ "An Introduction to Ballistic Missile Defense: New Nuclear Deterrence Strategies and Japan's BMD, written by Kaneda Hideaki (2003, Kaya Shobo)"

Source: Shogakukan Encyclopedia Nipponica About Encyclopedia Nipponica Information | Legend

抑止とは、一般に自らの力を行使するとみせて他者を威嚇し、他者に一定の行動を抑えとどまらせることを意味する。処罰や制裁という脅しによって他者の行動に影響を与えるという点にかんがみれば、権力行使の一変種であるといえる。この抑止概念は、おもに冷戦時代の米ソ間の核戦略上でみられた現象であり、自らの核兵器を可能な限り拡大・増強することで報復攻撃能力を高め、相手側の先制攻撃を踏みとどまらせるものであった。それゆえに、米ソ両国の間では相互核抑止mutual nuclear deterrenceのシステムが存在し、相互に核の使用を抑止するという関係ができあがっていた。つまりそれは相手側の攻撃におびえるがあまり、相手以上の核を保有することになり、「恐怖の均衡」ともいえるものであった。その恐怖の均衡の呪縛(じゅばく)から解放されない以上、核兵器増強は必然であり、相手側の国民を何度も殺せるほどの過剰殺戮(さつりく)能力を保有しあう結果になった。そうした能力の保有は逆説的にいっそう米ソ間に核戦争の発生を絶対的に防止する要請を生じさせ、米ソ核戦争防止のための危機管理装置の制度化を模索させたのである。

　結果的に両国間の抑止メカニズムは核戦争が発生しなかったという意味で効果を発揮したといえるが、その場合に重要なのは、両者がともに損得といった合理的な計算を行いうる状態にあるということである。仮に自らの攻撃が自らの壊滅につながることも「是(ぜ)」とする思考であれば、抑止のメカニズムは作動しない。抑止には合理的な計算を行いうる対称的な勢力の関係が必要である。ベトナム戦争においてアメリカの威嚇や制裁を無視してベトナム解放勢力が戦い、勝利を収めたように、非対称的な関係においては抑止が作動する可能性は乏しくなってくる。その意味からすれば、アメリカのたび重なる威嚇に対する、イスラム原理主義過激派の対米攻撃の継続、そしてイラクのサダム・フセイン体制時にみられた強硬姿勢の堅持、北朝鮮の金正日(きんしょうにち／キムジョンイル)体制による核開発再開を通じての対米挑戦姿勢などは、非対称性による抑止機能の不全を示す事例といえる。したがって、アメリカが21世紀安全保障戦略の一環とするミサイル防衛構想は抑止概念が背景に存在しているといえるが、アメリカとは非対称的な敵対勢力に関する実効性は乏しいといわざるをえない。

［青木一能］

『日本国際政治学会編・刊『転換期の核抑止と軍備管理』（1989）』▽『佐藤誠三郎編『東西関係の戦略論的分析』（1990・日本国際問題研究所）』▽『ロバート・D・グリーン著、梅林宏道・阿部純子訳『検証「核抑止論」――現代の「裸の王様」』（2000・高文研）』▽『吉田文彦著『証言・核抑止の世紀――科学と政治はこう動いた』（2000・朝日新聞社）』▽『金田秀昭著『弾道ミサイル防衛入門――新たな核抑止戦略とわが国のBMD』（2003・かや書房）』

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